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TITLE I
INTRODUCTION: THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
1. DEFINITION
An economic and monetary union [hereinafter EMU] can be defined as an area
in which there is complete freedom of movement of persons, goods, services and capital.
Additionally, the financial markets are completely integrated while the national currencies
are conventional and have irrevocable fixed exchange rates. In the end, the national
currencies may be replaced by a common currency and there will be one monetary
policy. 1
The economic and monetary union is considered to be the highest form of
economic integration. Usually, one gives the following hierarchy: 2
1) Free Trade Zone: Tariffs and quotas between the participants are abolished. However,
participants keep their own tariffs and quota vis-a-vis third countries.
2) Customs Union: In addition to the conditions for a Free Trade Zone, there is also a
common tariff vis-a-vis third countries.
3) Common Market: There is not only freedom of movement of goods (cf. Customs
Union), but also freedom of movement of labor and capital.
4) Economic Union: Aside from the conditions for a common market, there is also an
harmonization of the economic policy.
5) Economic and Monetary Union: Besides the conditions for an Economic Union there
are also pegged exchange rates and a coordination of the monetary policy. Possibly, a
common currency is introduced. 3
22. ANALYSIS
The introduction of a monetary union is, of course, not a step which is taken
without balancing carefully the possible advantages and disadvantages. One could give
the following analysis: 4
2.1. Advantages
- a common currency has the advantages of money in general (means of payment, unit
of account, store of value); as a result transaction costs are reduced and exchange risks
are diminished. Consequently, a common currency raises the allocative efficiency and
the growth potential in the common market.
- a common currency makes speculative capital flows between the partner countries
impossible.
- there is less need for international reserves because exchange reserves for transactions
between member countries are no longer necessary.
- monetary integration can stimulate better coordination of the economic policy and
further economic integration. There will also be an external pressure on the
economic policy, which will give this policy more credibility.
- monetary integration can give the zone more weight in international monetary matters.
2.2. Disadvantages
- there is a loss of independence in the field of monetary and exchange rate policy.
- restrictions are imposed on the national budgetary policy.
- the unemployment rate may rise temporarily when a deflationary policy must be
enforced in order to defend the exchange rate.
- regional imbalances may get worse.
33. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This thesis examines two examples of a monetary union. The first part focuses
on the blueprint for a European monetary union (as laid out in the Treaty on European
Union); the second part analyzes the American example (the Federal Reserve System).
The third and last part discusses the similarities and differences between the two systems,
and argues that although both systems look very similar, there are important differences
which can be explained mainly by the lack of political integration in Europe.
TITLE n
THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION
CHAPTER 1 THE ROAD TOWARDS AN EMU IN EUROPE
1. HISTORY
The road towards an economic and monetary union in Europe has been a very
difficult one. 5As early as 1962, the Commission submitted a proposal that would realize
an economic and monetary union in three stages by 1971. 6 The proposal was not acted
upon until 1969 when a renewed interest from the part of the Commission resulted in the
so-called memorandum Barre.
In the same year, initiatives were taken during the The Hague summit7 which
resulted in the creation of the Werner Committee. This Committee submitted its final
report on 8 October 19708 . On 22 March 1971 a resolution of the council and the
representatives of the governments of the Member States was published9 . The resolution
was very ambitious, 10 but the enthusiasm disappeared quickly because of international
monetary problems (instability of the dollar, oil crises, lack of convergence in Europe).
These turbulences blocked any further integration at that moment. From 18 December
1971, the calm was restored after an agreement was reached on new exchange rates with
wider margins (Smithsonian Agreement).
On 22 March 1972, a new resolution on the economic and monetary union was
presented 11 which reenforced the previous one of March 1971 (this resolution was the
basis of the so-called snake-mechanism). The international monetary events proved too
strong for this system and the snake-mechanism was very soon limited to the Benelux
countries, Denmark and Germany.
5In 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) was set up and seemed to work
satisfactory (although some concerns were raised at the beginning). The EMS was,
however, in essence only a flexible exchange-rate agreement and everybody had started
to think that the plans for an eventual economic and monetary union were buried when
this notion reappeared in the Single European Act of 1986. n The monetary union could,
pursuant to Article 102a only be achieved through a revision of the treaty. 13 Other
measures relating to coordination of the national monetary and economic policy remained
possible, for example, on the basis of articles 103, 105 and 235.
During the Summit at Hanover on 17 and 18 June 1988, the European Council
decided to compose a committee that would study the realization of an economic and
monetary union (Delors Committee). 14 The report of this Committee (Report on the
Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community), which was presented on
17 April 1989 at the Madrid Summit, brought the monetary integration again into the
spotlight. The report was comprised of three chapters: the first was dedicated to the
previous developments in the field of monetary integration; the second described the
ultimate stage in the realization of an economic and monetary union and the last chapter
addressed the stages on the road towards an economic and monetary union. The work of
the Delors Committee provoked many reactions, not only on the part of monetary
experts, but also from national governments. The British government presented her "hard
ECU proposal", the idea of which was to create a new currency in Europe. This
currency would be hard in the sense that it could never be devaluated vis-a-vis another
currency of the European Monetary System. 15 Also the French and the Spanish
governments formulated counter proposals to which we won't dedicate any attention in
this thesis. It should be noted that the Delors report was a working document without any
legal consequences. The practical realization of it would be achieved by way of a new
Treaty.
62. THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT
In December 1990, two intergovernmental conferences were initiated in Europe:
the first was dedicated to the economic and monetary union, the other conference
addressed the political union. 16On 9 and 10 December 1991, after almost one year of
work, the conclusions were laid out in the Treaty on European Union [hereinafter Treaty
of Maastricht]. 17 The treaty was signed formally on 7 February 1992.
The basis of the new provisions was a Luxembourg proposal of June 1991. In this
proposal, Europe was viewed as a temple with three pillars: the first one consisted of the
existing communities to which new competencies would be added (currency,
environment, education,...). In these areas decisions would be taken by majority vote.
The second pillar is formed by foreign policy and security, and the third one by justice
and internal affairs. Within these pillars, decisions can only be taken by unanimity.
This compromise became the basis of the Treaty of Maastricht which would
normally have entered into force on 1 January 1993. 18 Of special importance in this
treaty are the monetary provisions. Already during the Summit in Madrid on 26 and 27
June 1989, the decision had been taken to introduce a common (European) means of
payment according to the provisions of the Delors report. It was decided that the first
stage should begin on 1 July 1990. 19 In Maastricht, the different stages were clearly
defined on their content and timing. The next chapters discuss the different stages
consecutively according to their content and institutions. Afterwards, we will consider
the transition between the three stages.
CHAPTER 2 THE CONTENT OF THE THREE EMU STAGES
1. THE FIRST STAGE
The first stage was initiated on 1 July 1990. 2(The goal of this stage was the
achievement of a further convergence of the economic performances of the Treaty
7members by means of a better coordination of the economic and monetary policy within
the existing institutional framework. The internal market in Europe should be completed
and the Treaty of Maastricht would be ratified, in order to allow a further realization of
the EMU in the following stages.
1.1. The Economic Aspects of the First Stage
1.1.1. After pointing to the basic principles of the open-market economy (Article 102a),
the new regulations organize a coordination of the national economic policy options
around broad guidelines. These guidelines will be formulated by the [ECO/FIN] Council
on a recommendation of the Commission. The European Council will discuss a
conclusion along these guidelines on the basis of which the [ECO/FIN] Council will
adopt a recommendation. The Council shall inform the European Parliament of this
recommendation. 21
These provisions are complemented by a multilateral surveillance, the purpose of
which is to achieve better coordination of economic policy and a sustained convergence
of the economic performances of the Member States. It is provided that the Council (on
the basis of reports submitted by the Commission) will monitor developments in each of
the Member States and in the Community as well as the consistency of economic policies
with the broad guidelines referred to. The Council will regularly carry out an overall
assessment for the purpose of surveillance. The Member States shall forward all
necessary information to the Commission. 22
Where it is established that the economic policies of a Member State are not
consistent with the broad guidelines mentioned above, or that they risk jeopardizing the
proper functioning of the economic and monetary union, the Council may (acting on a
recommendation from the Commission), by a qualified majority, make the necessary
recommendations to the Member State concerned. By means of the same procedure, the
8Council may decide to make its recommendations public (this is the only sanction
provided). 23
The President of the Council and the Commission shall report to the European
Parliament on the results of the multilateral surveillance. In case the Council has made
its recommendations public, its President may be invited to appear before the competent
Committee of the European Parliament. 24
It is important to note that the arrangements mentioned above (concerning the
formulation of broad guidelines and the multilateral surveillance) are not limited to the
first stage. They are permanent rules in the construction of the economic and monetary
union.
1.1.2. Article 103a. 1 provides that the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission, may decide upon the measures appropriate to the economic situation (in
particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products).25
1.1.3. During the first stage, the Member States will adopt the appropriate measures to
remove all restrictions on the movement of capital and all restrictions on payments
between Member States and between Member States and third countries. 26
1.1.4. The Member states are also expected to take measures which prohibit monetary
financing27 along with measures that abolish privileged access by any Government or
public undertaking to financial institutions. 28
1.1.5. Economies and public finances will be harmonized; in order to achieve this
multiannual programs will be submitted to the [ECO/FIN] Council. 29
91.1.6. The economic policy of every Member State will be examined very carefully. The
Council will, on the basis of a report from the Commission, assess the progress made
with regard to the economic and monetary convergence. The examination will focus on
price stability, public finances, and the progress made with the implementation of
Community law concerning the internal market. 30
1.2. The Monetary Aspects of the First Stage
1.2.1. No institutional provisions are provided for the first stage to help achieve
monetary union. 31 The present discretion between the Central Banks (within the
Committee of Presidents of the Central Banks) will continue.
1.2.2. Yet, one should note Article 109g of the Treaty: "The currency composition of
the ECU basket shall not be changed." The importance of this provision is clear: every
possibility to change the composition of the basket will disappear as soon as the Treaty
of Maastricht is ratified. This ratification became a fact on 1 November 1993, which
means that the ECU-basket as defined in 198932 is the final and last composition of the
ECU.
2. THE SECOND STAGE
The second stage started on 1 January 1994. 33This stage is characterized by a
further coordination of economic and monetary policy. The economic part of EMU is
nearly completed in this stage while one also takes a decisive step on the road towards
monetary union. In spite of this, the different national authorities will keep their
responsibilities for the conduct of monetary policy within the respective Member
States.
34
10
2.1. The Economic Aspects of the Second Stage
2.1.1. As stated above, the provisions relating to free movement of capital and to
freedom of payments between Member States will take full effect. Restrictions on
movements of capital and on payments between Member States and third countries will
be equally forbidden. In spite of this, some exceptions have been provided for Member
States which on 31 December 1993 enjoy a derogation on the basis of existing
Community law. 35Furthermore, certain restrictions remain possible which are applicable
to both transactions within Member States as well as between Member States and third
countries. 36 The same goes for certain restrictions which apply only to the movement
of capital to and from third countries. 37 Until the Member States proceed to the third
stage, Articles 109h and 109i of the EEC Treaty remain relevant.
2.1.2. The prohibition on monetary financing will take full effect. The future European
Central Bank and the Central Banks of the different Member States will not be allowed
to provide overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility in favor of Community
institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities,
other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of the Member States. The
purchase of debt instruments directly from those entities by the European Central Bank
or the national central banks is equally forbidden. 38
2.1.3. The prohibition of privileged access of the government to the financial sector will
be implemented in the second stage. 39
2.1.4. The Treaty of Maastricht also provides a declaration of non-liability. 40 The
purpose of this is to make clear that the Community shall not be liable for the
commitments of Member States and that a solvent Member State cannot be called upon
11
to cover the debts of one of the 1 1 other EC-countries ("no bail out"). This arrangement
is without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific
project.
2.1.5. During the second stage, the Member States will endeavor to avoid excessive
government41 deficits. 42The Commission will examine compliance with budgetary
discipline on the basis of two criteria: 43
-whether the ratio of the deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3 % at market prices
(unless the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that
comes close to the reference value or unless the excess over the reference value is only
exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value); and
-whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds 60 % at market
prices, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value
at a satisfactory pace.
The Commission will monitor the development of the budgetary situation and the
stock of government debt in the Member States. In case a Member State does not fulfill
the requirements under either of the two criteria mentioned above (or if there is a risk
of an excessive deficit in a Member State), the Commission will prepare a report. 44 The
report will also take into account whether the government deficit exceeds government
investment expenditure and consider all other relevant factors, including the medium-term
economic and budgetary position of the Member-State.45 The Monetary Committee will
formulate an opinion on this report46 ; afterwards,
47
it will be submitted to the Council.
The Council will (on a recommendation of the Commission and after considering any
observation the Member State concerned wants to make) decide whether an excessive
deficit exists. 48
In case the Council decides that there is an excessive deficit, it will make
recommendations to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing that situation
12
to an end within a given period. 49 If the Member State does not comply with these
recommendations, they can be made public. 50 During the second stage, this is the most
severe sanction possible. 51 To the extent that the excessive deficit in the Member State
has been corrected, the Council will abrogate its sanctions and may make a public
statement that an excessive deficit in the Member State concerned no longer exists. 52
2.2. The Monetary Aspects of the Second Stage
2.2.1. Institutionally, the second stage is characterized by the establishment of a
European Monetary Institute (EMI) which can be considered the precursor of the
European Central Bank. At the same time, the Committee of Governors [of the Central
Banks] will be dissolved. 53
The European Monetary Institute will work mainly on monetary policy
coordination and the preparation of stage three. It is an independent entity with legal
personality; the EMI will be directed and managed by a Council consisting of a
President54 and the Governors of the national central banks. For reasons of clearness,
the functioning of the EMI will be discussed in a separate chapter dedicated to the
institutional aspects of the three EMU-stages.
2.2.2. The exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System will become
more and more emphasized during the second stage. Indeed, one of the criteria which
will be used to decide whether the "high degree of sustainable convergence" necessary
for the transition to the third stage {see infra) has been achieved within the Community
is related to this mechanism. Article 109j states that one of the conditions necessary for
the transition is "the observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the
exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years,
without devaluing against the currency of any other Member State. " Provided that the
13
"Community exam" on the conditions for transition to the third stage will be held at the
end of 1996, the beginning of the second stage is also necessarily be the beginning of the
exchange rate discipline.
2.2.3. During the second stage, each Member State will start the process leading to the
independence of its central bank."Article 108 asks that each Member State will ensure
that its national legislation (including the statutes of its central bank) will be compatible
with the Treaty of Maastricht and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
at the latest on the date of the establishment of the ESCB.
3. THE THIRD STAGE
3.1. The Economic Aspects of the Third Stage
3.1.1. A procedure has been introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht which creates the
possibility of Community financial assistance for Member States which are, due to
exceptional occurrences, in difficulties or which are seriously threatened with severe
difficulties. In such a case, the Council decides, acting unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission, on the granting of aid. Where the difficulties are caused by natural
disasters, a qualified majority is sufficient. The President of the Council will inform the
European Parliament of the decision taken. 56
3.1.2. In the third stage, Member States will have to avoid excessive government
deficits. 57 As opposed to the second stage, certain sanctions are provided. In case a
Member State persists in failing to put into practice the recommendations of the Council,
the Council may decide to notify the Member State to take, within a specified time-limit,
measures for the necessary deficit reduction. First, the Council may request the Member
14
State to submit reports in accordance with a specific timetable in order to examine the
efforts made by the State. In case the Council is not satisfied with the cooperation from
the Member State concerned, it may decide to apply measures ranging from the
requirement to publish additional information before issuing bonds and securities, or an
invitation to the European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending policy towards the
Member State concerned to the requirement to make a non-interest-bearing deposit of an
appropriate size with the Community until the excessive deficit has been corrected. If it
is deemed necessary, the Council may also decide to impose fines of an appropriate
size. 58 All decisions taken will be communicated to the European Parliament. 59 As
soon as the excessive deficit has been corrected, the decisions taken will be abrogated. 60
3.1.3. The Council may, on a proposal from the Commission and after Consulting the
ECB, acting by a qualified majority decide on the position of the Community at
international levels as regards to issues of particular relevance to the EMU. The Council
may also (this unanimously) decide its representation in these matters.
3.2. The Monetary Aspects of the Third Stage
The uniform monetary policy will be conducted within a new institutional
framework.
3.2.1. The European Central Bank61 will be established as the pivot of a European
System of Central Banks [hereinafter ESCB]. 62 The ESCB is a conglomerate of thirteen
central banks: the twelve banks of the Member States and the new ECB. 63
The ECB is explicitly attributed legal personality64 while the ESCB is not. The
competencies and obligations of the ESCB are those of the thirteen legal persons that
compose the system. 65 In case the internal competencies are not specified, the principle
of subsidiarity will be applied. 66 The ECB and the ESCB will be examined in detail in
the chapters dedicated to the institutional provisions of the three EMU-stages. 67
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3.2.2. The third stage also envisions the birth of an Economic and Financial
Committee. 68 The importance of this Committee will also be discussed in the part on
the institutional provisions of the Maastricht Treaty.
3.2.3. At the starting date of the third Stage, the Council will, acting with the unanimity
of the Member States without a derogation (see infra), on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the ECB, adopt the conversion rate at which the EC-
currencies will be irrevocably fixed and at which rate the ECU will be substituted for
these currencies. At this point, the ECU will become a currency in its own right. 69
The Council will, acting according to the same procedure, also take the other measures
necessary for the rapid introduction of the ECU as the single currency in the EC Member
States.
70
Primarily, this means that notes and coins denominated in ECU will be brought
into circulation. Article 105a provides that the European Central Bank will have the
exclusive right to authorize the issuance of banknotes within the Community. The notes
may be issued either by the ECB or by the national central banks. They will be the only
notes to have the status of legal tender within the Community. Member States are
allowed to issue coins subject to approval by the ECB on the volume of the issue. 71
CHAPTER 3 THE INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IN THE TREATY OF
MAASTRICHT
1. THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
Article 109c. 1 provides for the establishment of a Monetary Committee which
will promote coordination of the policies of the Member States. The text of the Treaty
suggests that this Committee will be created on the date of the ratification of the Treaty
of Maastricht. This is not the case: the Monetary Committee has been functioning since
16
1958 (cf. Article 105 EEC-Treaty); but its mission is slightly redefined in the context of
the new perspectives opened by the Treaty of Maastricht. The Monetary Committee will
be dissolved at the beginning of the third stage. 72
1.1. Composition
The Member States and the Commission will each appoint two members to the
Monetary Committee. 73
1.2. Tasks
The tasks of the Committee can be outlined as follows: 74
- to keep under review the monetary and financial situation of the Member States and of
the Community, and the general payments system of the Member States. The Monetary
Committee will regularly report hereon to the Council and to the Commission;
- to deliver opinions to the Council and the Commission (at their request on or its own
initiative);
- to contribute to certain duties of the Council;
- to examine, at least once a year, the situation regarding the movement of capital and
the freedom of payments, as they result from the application of the Treaty of Maastricht
and of measures adopted by the Council. The Committee will report to the Commission
and to the Council on the outcome of this examination.
2. THE EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE
2.1. Structure
The European Monetary Institute (EMI) was established at the start of the second
stage.
75 The members of the EMI are the national banks of the Member States.76 The
Institute has legal personality and is directed and managed by a Council composed of a
17
President and of the Governors of the national central banks.^The President is
appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States at the level of
Heads of State or Government. 78As soon as the EMI had been set up, both the
Committee of Governors [of the central banks of the Member States] and the European
Monetary Cooperation Fund79 were dissolved. 80
2.2. Tasks
The EMI has to contribute to the creation of the conditions necessary for the
transition to the third stage of the EMU. In order to achieve this it will: 81
- strengthen cooperation between the national central banks;
- monitor the functioning of the European Monetary System;
- hold consultations concerning issues falling within the competence of the national
central banks and affecting the stability of financial institutions and markets;
- take over the tasks of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund;
- facilitate the use of the ECU and oversee its development, including the functioning of
the ECU clearing system;
- hold regular consultations concerning the course of monetary policies and the use of
monetary policy instruments; and
- normally be consulted by the national monetary authorities before they take decisions
on the course of monetary policy in the context of the common framework of ex ante
coordination.
For the preparation of the third stage, the EMI will: 82
- prepare the instruments and the procedures necessary for carrying out a single monetary
policy in the third stage;
- promote the harmonization, where necessary, of the rules and practices governing the
collection, compilation and distribution of statistics in the areas within its field of
competence;
18
- prepare the rules for operation to be undertaken by the national central banks within the
framework of the ESCB;
- promote the efficiency of cross-border payments;
- supervise the technical preparation of ECU banknotes.
Before 31 December 1996 the EMI will specify the regulatory, organizational and
logistical framework necessary for the ESCB to perform its tasks in the third stage. This
framework shall be submitted for decision to the European Central Bank at the date of
its establishment. 83
2.3. Means
In the light of the tasks mentioned above, the European Monetary Institute can
act on both the Community and the International level.
2.3.1. On the Community level, the EMI may, acting by a majority of two-thirds of the
members of its Council: 84
- formulate opinions or recommendations on the overall orientation of monetary policy
and exchange-rate policy as well as on related measures introduced in each Member
State;
- submit opinions or recommendations to governments and to the Council on policies
which might affect the internal or external monetary situation in the Community and
in particular, the functioning of the European Monetary System;
- make recommendations to the monetary authorities of the Member States concerning
the conduct of their monetary policy
Furthermore, the EMI may unanimously decide to publish its opinions and its
recommendations.
The EMI will be consulted by the Council and the authorities of the Member
States regarding any proposed Community Act or any draft legislative provision within
19
its field of competence. The European Monetary Institute may hold and manage foreign
exchange reserves as an agent for and at the request of national central banks. Profits and
losses resulting from these operations are for the account of the national central bank
depositing the reserves. The EMI will perform this function on the basis of bilateral
contracts in accordance with rules laid down in a decision of the EMI. 85
2.3.2. In the international field, emphasis must be placed on the fact that the EMI may
"grant to the monetary authorities of third countries and to international institutions the
status of 'other holders' of ECU'S and fix the terms and conditions under which such
ECU's may be acquired, held or used by other holders." 86
2.4. Independence
Article 8 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European Monetary Institute
emphasizes that the members of the Council of the EMI act "according to their own
responsibilities." The same article stresses that the Council of the EMI may not seek or
take any instructions from Community institutions and bodies or governments of
Member States. Both the Community and the national authorities undertake to respect this
principle and not to seek to influence the Council of the EMI in the performance of its
tasks.
3. THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
3.1. Structure
The European Central Bank [hereinafter ECB] executes its tasks via three organs:
the Governing Council, the Executive Board, and the General Council.
20
3.1.1. The Executive Board
The Executive Board of the ECB will be composed of a President, a Vice-
President, and four other Members. 87They will be appointed from among nationals of
Member States of recognized standing and professional experience in monetary or
banking matters. Their appointment will be made by common accord of the governments
of the Member States at the level of Heads of State or Government, on a
recommendation from the Council after it consulted the European Parliament and the
Governing Council of the ECB. The term of office is fixed at eight years, and is not
renewable. 88
The Executive Board will implement monetary policy in accordance with the
guidelines and decisions laid down by the Governing Council {see infra) and will give
the necessary instructions to the national central banks. The Executive Board may also
have certain powers delegated to it where the Governing Council so decides. 89
3.1.2. The Governing Council
The Governing Council of the ECB will be composed of the members of the
Executive Board of the ECB and the Governors of the national central banks.90 The
tasks of this organ consist of adopting of the guidelines and making of the decisions
necessary to ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to the ESCB under the Treaty
[of Maastricht] and the statute [of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank]. The Governing Council will formulate the monetary policy of
the Community and establish the necessary guidelines for its implementation. 91
The Governing Council will adopt "Rules of Procedure" which determine the
internal organization of the ECB and its decision-making bodies. 92Each member of the
Governing Council will have one vote, except for certain decisions related to the
financial organization of the ECB. Normally, the Governing Council will act by a simple
majority. In the event of a tie, the President has the casting vote. 93
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3.1.3. The General Council
The General Council is a temporary94 organ which consists of the President and
the Vice-President of the ECB and the Governors of the national central banks. The other
members of the Executive Board may participate in meetings of the Council, but are not
allowed to vote. 95
The tasks of the Council are listed in full96 in Article 47 of the Statute. Among
the responsibilities mentioned are the performance of certain tasks of the EMI which
must still be completed due to the derogations (see infra) of one or more Member States;
contribution to advisory functions of the ECB; the taking of measures necessary for the
application of Article 29 [of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank], namely the subscription of the ECB's
capital, etc....
3.2. Tasks
3.2.1. General Responsibilities
The tasks and responsibilities of the European Central Bank are determined by
those of the ESCB (see infra). At this point, it may be sufficing to point at Article 108a
which states that in order to carry out the tasks entrusted to the ESCB, the ECB may by
means of regulations:
- define and implement the monetary policy of the Community;
- require credit institutions established in Member States to hold minimum reserves on
accounts with the ECB and national central banks;
- ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Community and
with other countries;
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- perform tasks conferred upon her by the Council under Article 105(6) concerning
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial
institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings;
- help implement the measures of the Council referred to in Article 106(6).
The ECB may also take decisions necessary for carrying out the tasks entrusted to the
ESCB, make recommendations and deliver opinions.^The ECB may decide to publish
its decisions, recommendations and opinions. 98 Within the limits and under the
conditions adopted by the Council under Article 106(6), the ECB shall be entitled to
impose fines or periodic penalty payments on undertakings in case they don't comply
with obligations under its regulations and decisions."
In order to be complete, we must point to the fact that the Treaty confers, on
different occasions, advisory functions upon the ECB; the ECB is also attributed
responsibilities in the field of prudential supervision and the collection of statistical
information. Both aspects will be explained briefly.
3.2.2. Advisory Functions
The European Central Bank is attributed an advisory function in the area of
exchange-rate policy100 and on any proposed Community act in its field of
competence. 101 The ECB will also be consulted by national authorities on any draft
legislative provision in its field of competence. The scope of the latter provision will be
specified by the Council in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article
106(6). 102
3.2.3. Prudential Supervision and Statistical Information
One of the tasks of the ESCB will be to contribute to the smooth conduct of
policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of
credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. 103Article 25 of the Protocol
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on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central
Bank makes clear that the ECB may offer advice (spontaneously or on the request of the
Council) to the Commission and the competent authorities of the Member States on the
scope and implementation of Community legislation relating to the prudential supervision
of credit institutions and to the stability of the financial system. Eventually, the ECB may
perform certain tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and other financial institutions, with the exception of insurance
undertakings. 104
The tasks performed by the national central banks in the field of the collection of
statistical information may be continued. According to Article 5 of the Protocol on the
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank it
is the responsibility of the ECB and the national central banks to collect the necessary
information the ESCB needs to perform her tasks. 105 Where necessary, the ECB will
contribute to the harmonization of the rules and practices in this field. 106
3.3. Means
The ECB disposes of, on the one hand, a capital, and, on the other hand, foreign
reserve assets which have been transferred to her by the national central banks.
3.3.1. Capital
The capital of the European Central Bank will consist ofECU 5.000 million. The
sole subscribers to and holders of this capital are the national central banks. The key for
subscription of this capital will be determined in function of the share of the respective
Member States in the population of the Community and in the gross domestic product of
the Community. 107
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3.3.2. Transfer of Foreign Reserve Assets to the ECB
The ECB will be provided by the national central banks with external foreign
reserve assets up to an amount equivalent to ECU 50.000 million. The Governing
Council will decide upon the proportion to be called up immediately after the
establishment of the ECB and upon the amounts to be called up at later dates. The ECB
has the right to hold and manage the foreign reserves that are transferred to it and to use
them for the purpose set out in the Statute [of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank]. 108
3.4. Independence
The provisions which must assure the independence of the organs responsible for
the monetary policy will be discussed in the following discussion on the European System
of Central Banks.
4. THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS
4.1. Structure
The ESCB will be composed of the ECB and of the national central
banks. 109The System will be governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB,
namely the Governing Council and the Executive Board. 110
4.2. Tasks
Article 105 states that the primary objective of the ESCB will be to maintain price
stability. Without prejudice to this objective, the ESCB is to support the general
economic policies in the Community. The System will act in accordance with the
principle of an open market economy. The tasks conferred upon the ESCB within this
frame, can be summed up as follows: 111
25
- in the first place, the ESCB is to define and implement the monetary policy of the
Community;
- the System will conduct foreign-exchange operations; 112
- a third task consists of the holding and managing of the official foreign reserves of the
Member States;
- the last responsibility is the promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems. 113
It has to be repeated that the ESCB will not have legal personality, and that the
task conferred upon this System will be carried out either by the European Central Bank
or by the different central banks of the Member States. If and when appropriate, the tasks
will be executed decentralized (application of the principle of subsidiarity). 114
4.3. Independence
4.3.1. Political Independence
The political independence of a central bank can be defined as its ability to choose
its economic policy objectives autonomously, without constraints or influence from the
government. 115In the Treaty of Maastricht, lots of attention has been dedicated to the
provisions that must guarantee the independence of the organs which will implement the
monetary policy. 116
* Article 107 states that neither the ECB nor a national central bank may seek or take
instructions when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred
upon them by the Treaty [of Maastricht] and the Statute of the ESCB. 117
* The financial means of the ESCB are separated from those of the Community and the
Member States. The accounts of the System will be audited by independent external
auditors. The Court of Auditors will only examine the operational efficiency of the
ECB. 118
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* The ECB has its own regulatory powers according to which it can make regulations,
take decisions, make recommendations and deliver opinions. 119
* Additionally, the Treaty tries to ensure independence by nonrenewability of terms so
that board members are not tempted to defer to the government in power, and by
staggering of the terms so that all members are not appointed by the same
administration. 120
In spite of these guarantees, certain ties with the political decision-making will
remain to exist.
* The Executive Board of the ECB consists, as mentioned above, of a President, a vice-
president and four other members. They are appointed by common accord of the
governments of the Member States at the level of heads of State or Government. The
appointment follows a recommendation from the [ECO/FIN] Council after it has
consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council. The term of office has
been fixed at eight years, and is nonrenewable. 121 The Governing Council of the
System consists of the Governors of the national central banks of the Member States that
entered the third stage and of the Members of the Executive Board of the ECB. National
and Community political influence may accordingly weigh on its composition. 122
* Members of the Executive Board and Governors of national central banks who no
longer fulfil the conditions required for the performance of their duties or who have been
guilty of misconduct may be relieved from office. 123 As far as members of the
Executive Board are concerned, the Court of Justice is competent. For the Governors
of the national central banks, national arrangements remain possible, but decisions taken
on the basis of these rules may be referred to the Court of Justice. 124
* Furthermore, it has been provided that the President of the [ECO/FIN] Council and a
member of the Commission may participate (without having the right to vote) in meetings
of the Governing Council of the ECB. 125Moreover, the President of the [ECO/FIN]
Council may submit a motion for deliberation. 126 On the other hand, the President of
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the ECB will be invited to participate in Council meetings when matters relating to the
objectives and tasks of the ESCB are discussed. 127
* The ECB will draw up an annual report on the activities of the ESCB and on the
monetary policy of both the previous and current year. This report will be submitted to
the European Parliament, the [ECO/FIN] Council, the Commission and to the European
Council. The President of the ECB will present this report to the Council and to the
European Parliament; the latter may hold a general debate on that basis. 128 It has also
been provided that the President of the ECB and the other members of the Executive
Board may, either at their own or at the request of the European Parliament, be heard
by the competent Committee of the European Parliament. 129
* Some feedback may result from the reporting commitments of the ECB. The ECB will
be required to draw up and publish at least quarterly a report on the activities of the
ESCB130 and a weekly consolidated financial statement. 131 These documents will be
made available to interested parties free of charge. 132
4.3.2. Economic Independence
Economic Independence is the ability to use without restrictions monetary policy
instruments to pursue monetary policy goals. 133The most common restraint appears to be
the obligation to finance public deficits. 134
The Treaty forbids the ECB to open lines of credit to European or national public
institutions. The ECB is also banned from participation in the primary market for
national government bonds, while participation in the secondary market is allowed to
implement open market operations. 135
5. THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE
At the start of the third stage, an Economic and Financial Committee will be
established; 136at the same time, the Monetary Committee will be dissolved. 137 At this
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point, there is no longer need for a group of independent experts to advise on the
coordination of national monetary policy: from the beginning of the third stage, a
common monetary policy will be conducted by a European System of Central Banks.
5.1. Structure
The Economic and Financial Committee is appointed by the Member States, the
Commission, and the ECB; each of which may appoint no more than two members to
the Committee. 138
5.2. Tasks
The tasks of this Committee are broad; they are outlined in Article 109c. 2. and
109c. 4. Specifically, the following responsibilities are within its field of competence:
- to deliver opinions to the Council or to the Commission (at their request or on its own
initiative);
- to keep under review the economic and financial situation of the Member States and of
the Community, and to report regularly thereon to the Council and to the Commission;
- to contribute to the preparation of certain works of the Council and to carry out other
advisory and preparatory tasks assigned to it by the Council;
- to examine, at least once a year, the situation regarding the movement of capital and
the freedom of payments, and to report thereon to the Commission and to the Council;
- if and as long as there are Member States with a derogation (see infra), the Committee
will keep under review the monetary and financial situation and the general payment
system of those Member States. It will regularly report to the Council and the
Commission hereon.
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CHAPTER 4 THE TRANSITION BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT EMU-STAGES
1. THE TRANSITION FROM THE FIRST TO THE SECOND STAGE
As mentioned before, the second stage started on 1 January 1994. 139The
transition occurred automatically and no criteria had to be met. Nevertheless, it had been
provided that the Council would, on the basis of a report from the Commission, assess
the progress made with regard to economic and monetary convergence and the progress
made with the implementation of Community law concerning the internal market. 140
2. THE TRANSITION FROM THE SECOND TO THE THIRD STAGE
2.1. Criteria
It was clear very soon that Germany would not be prepared to give up the
Deutschmark without guarantees for the credibility of the new currency. The following
arrangement has been provided.
The Commission and the EMI will report to the Council on the progress made in
the fulfillment of the Member States of their obligations regarding the achievement of a
economic and monetary union. 141The report will address the compatibility of each
national legislation, including the statutes of its national central bank, with the Treaty.
Central in the report, however, will be the criteria of convergence which must be
fulfilled by the Member States: 142
- the rate of inflation must be close to that of, at most, the three best performing Member
States in terms of price stability; 143
- the government budgetary position may not show an excessive deficit in the sense of
Article 104c. 6;
144
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- the Member States are expected to observe the normal fluctuation margins provided for
by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System for at least two
years, without devaluing against the currency of any other Member State; 145
- the long-term interest-rate levels may not exceed by more than two percentage points
that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price
stability.
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The reports will also take into account the development of the ECU, the results of the
integration of markets, the situation and development of the balances of payments on
current account and an examination of the development of unit labor costs and other price
indices. 147
On the basis of the reports, the [ECO/FIN] Council will, acting by a qualified
majority of the votes and on a recommendation from the Commission, decide: 148
- for each Member State, whether it fulfills the necessary conditions for the adoption of
a single currency;
- whether a majority of the Member States fulfil the necessary conditions for the adoption
of a single currency.
The [ECO/FIN] Council will formulate a recommendation to the Council in the
composition of the Heads of State or Government; the European Parliament will be
consulted and invited to forward its opinion to the latter Council.
The Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government,
will at the latest by 31 December 1996 decide: 149
- whether a majority of the Member States fulfil the necessary conditions for the adoption
of a single currency,
- and whether it is appropriate for the Community to enter the third stage.
If the Council formulates a positive answer on both questions, it will set the date for the
beginning of the third stage.
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The Treaty provides that, in case by the end of 1997 the date for the beginning
of the third stage has not been set, this stage will start on 1 January 1999. 15° In this
case, the Council will, before 1 July 1988, confirm which Member States fulfil the
necessary conditions for the adoption of a single currency. 151
2.2. Derogations
It is to be expected that not all Member States will enter simultaneously the third
stage. The Treaty provides that the stragglers will have the status of "Member States with
a derogation." 152 They are placed on a waiting list to be reconsidered for participation
as soon as they meet the conditions. 153The [ECO/FIN] Council will decide which
Member States will have a derogation; this Council will, at least every two years or at
the request of a Member State with a derogation, examine whether the derogations can
be abrogated. 154
The most important arrangements concerning the third stage are not applicable to
Member States with a derogation. 155 Accordingly, those Member States retain their
powers in the field of monetary policy. 156The voting rights of Member States with a
derogation will be suspended for the Council decisions based on articles which are not
applicable to them. 157 Their national central banks will be drawn into the European
System of Central Banks but important provisions in the Statute of this System are not
applicable to them. 158It has also been provided that Member States with a derogation
will not pay up their subscribed capital to the ECB unless the General Council {see infra)
decides that a minimal percentage of it has to be paid as a contribution to the operational
costs of the European Central Bank. 159
As long as there are Member States with a derogation, a third decision-making
body will be constituted in the ECB: the General Council. 160 The General Council will
consist of the President and the Vice-President of the ECB and of the Governors of the
national central banks. The other members of the Executive Board may participate,
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without having the right to vote, in meetings of the General Council. 161The
responsibilities of the General Council are listed in full in Article 47 of the Statute [of
the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank]. 162They
concentrate on the coordinating tasks of the EMI which in the third stage have to be
executed by the ECB.
The Member States with a derogation will have to prove themselves in a renewed
European Monetary System. 163 Furthermore, they will have to comply with all the
obligations of the second stage. It has to be specified, however, that they will be obliged
to avoid excessive government deficits (although no sanctions can be taken in case they
don't comply with this obligation). 164
2.3. Exceptions for the United Kingdom andfor Denmark
In the Treaty of Maastricht, exceptions have been included for two countries.
Both the United Kingdom and Denmark asked and obtained exceptions relating to the
transition to the third stage.
In a separate protocol 165
,
the United Kingdom is assured that it cannot be
obliged to enter the third stage without a separate decision by its government and
Parliament. In case the United Kingdom would decide not to move to the third stage of
economic and monetary union, it will have an ad hoc status, which can be compared with
that of a Member State with a derogation. 166
The Danish position is also clarified in a separate protocol, 167in which the
Danish participation in the third stage of economic and monetary union is made subject
to a referendum. In case Denmark, on the basis of this referendum, decides not to move
to the third stage, it will have the status of a Member State with a derogation which can
only be abrogated at its own request.
TITLE HI
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
CHAPTER 1 HISTORY
1. FROM THE INDEPENDENCE TO 1913
The British colonies in North America suffered a shortage of specie. 168The
colonists had to seek constantly for additional forms of money. Commodities were very
commonly used as a medium of exchange. They were later supplemented by merchant
bank notes and periodic note issues from colonial legislatures. The British, however,
tried to restrict and inhibit colonial paper. They wanted to bring specie home and feared
losses to their merchant creditors.
During the struggle for independence, the Continental Congress issued $242
million in paper money to finance the Revolutionary War. The different states issued
another $209 million, while $8 million was borrowed in foreign specie. The new nation
eventually won its military and political independence, 169 but its finances were a
shambles. 170 The U.S. Constitution situated the power to conduct monetary policy from
the beginning at the federal level. 171 It would take, however, more than 120 years
before an - initially weak - central banking system was set up.
The first major step in this direction was the establishment of the First Bank of
the United States (1791-181 1). 172 This bank was created to oversee the commercial
banking system and attempt to maintain a stable economy. 173Agrarian and state bank
interests prevented rechartering of the national bank in 1811. 174The war of 1812,
however, proved the need for a reliable note issue and a strong method of federal
government borrowing. 175
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As a result, the Second Bank of the U.S. was set up in 1816. 176 This bank never
took up a role as a modern central bank, but at least established the potential for such
activity. State banks, however, did their utmost to fight the bank because they objected
to its control of their operations. 177 Although the bill to renew the charter passed both
houses of Congress, the Second Bank of the United States was liquidated in 1836 because
President Jackson vetoed charter extension. 178
The first era of "central bank" development in the U.S. was ended. Local,
decentralized banks were to become the dominant tradition in American banking history.
The period between 1836 and 1863 is known as the free banking era. Between
those dates, states served as sole chartering authority for banking institutions.
In 1863, during the Civil War, it proved possible to adopt stronger federal
legislation. The National Bank Act of 1863 179 encouraged federal chartering of state
banks. The Comptroller of the Currency would be responsible for the screening and
supervision of the national banks. 180 However, the tendencies toward decentralized state
charter banking resumed their influence. It was not until 1913 - and after three major
panics and depressions - that a real move was made towards "central bank" regulation
in the European sense.
2. THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT OF 1913
At the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, several banking
panics occurred in the United States, culminating with a major crisis in 1907. 181 This
motivated another attempt to establish a central bank. 182 The Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 30
June 1908 183 was a direct result of the latter crisis. 184The act provided for the
issuance of an emergency currency and for the appointment of a National Monetary
Commission. 185 The Commission was asked to carry on an investigation of banking
systems and to report thereon to Congress with a view to the adoption of a permanent
reform measure. 186The results were published in a series of many volumes. 187Senator
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Aldrich introduced his own plan 188 for a central bank in Congress on 8 January 1912,
together with the report of the Commission.The plan was not acted upon, the main
objection being that it meant too great a centralization of power in the hands of the
"financial interests" of Wall Street. 189 Meanwhile, on 26 June 1913, Carter Glass (head
of the House Banking and Currency Committee) introduced a counter proposal, which
after being modified by the Senate Banking Committee chaired by Senator Owen, became
known as the Owen-Glass Bill. 190 The Federal Reserve Act, although opposed by
bankers, various business organizations and some writers on economic and financial
questions, 191 was signed into law on 23 December 1913 by President Wilson. 192The
Act was passed "to provide for the establishment of Federal Reserve Banks, to furnish
an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a
more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes. " 193It
was as far as the United States could go toward central bank regulation at that stage in
its history. 194
The Federal Reserve System assumed gradually greater powers with the New Deal
reforms (1933-1935). The real independence for the new monetary structure was only
achieved by the "Accord of 1951" with the Treasury. 195In the following chapter, we will
discuss the parts that compose the Federal Reserve System as they exist and work
today. 196
CHAPTER 2 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The "Fed" as it exists today, has five major components. We will discuss
successively the Board of Governors, the Federal Reserve District Banks, the Member
Banks, the Federal Open Market Committee and the Advisory Committees.
36
1. BOARD OF GOVERNORS
1.1. Structure
The Board of Governors is composed of seven individual members with offices
in Washington, D.C. 197 The members are appointed by the President of the United
States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 198 They hold their office for
a nonrenewable 199 term of 14 years. 200 The starting terms have been staggered so that
one term expires every even-numbered year. 201The Chairman and Vice Chairman of
the Board are designated by the President of the United States from among the members
of the Board; each to serve for four years. 202Their appointment is subject to Senate
approval. 203
1.2. Tasks
The prime function of the Board of Governors is the formulation of monetary
policy. Additionally, the Board has supervisory and regulatory powers over the
operations of the Federal Reserve District Banks and over the activities of commercial
banks. 204
1.2.1. Monetary Policy
The responsibility for monetary policy is widely considered to be the Fed's most
important task, although this function was not one of the purposes envisioned in the
original Federal Reserve Act. 205 The members of the Board constitute a majority within
the Federal Open Market Committee (see infra), the most important decision-making
body in the field of monetary policy. 206 The Board also fixes the reserve requirements
for depository institutions, 207 reviews and approves the discount rates of the Federal
Reserve Banks208 and issues regulations governing the administration of their discount
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window. 209 In addition, the Board sets margin requirements on credit purchases in the
stock market. 210
1.2.2. Regulatory Powers
In addition to its responsibilities in the field of monetary policy, the Board of
Governors has extensive power over most banking operations in the United States. 211
* A blanket clause in the Federal Reserve Act gives the Board the power to exercise
"general supervision" over the Federal Reserve District Banks. 212 This includes the
power to examine them, 213 to ask for reports, 214 set the discount rates they allow
borrowing members215 and to regulate their check clearing operations. 216 The Board
can permit (or, under certain conditions, require) Federal Reserve Banks to rediscount
the discounted paper of other Federal Reserve Banks at rates of interest to be fixed by
the Board. 217 The Board of Governors may remove or suspend any officer or director
of any Federal Reserve Bank, 218 require the writing off of doubtful or worthless assets
upon the books and balance sheets. 219 It can even suspend (for the violation of the
Federal Reserve Act) the operations of any Federal Reserve Bank, liquidate it, or
reorganize it. 220 The Board also supervises the relations between the different Reserve
Banks and foreign banks. 221
* The Board of Governors, together with several other agencies222
,
also regulates the
commercial banking system of the United States. The Board of Governors exercises
supervisory authority over both national banks and the state banks that choose to become
members of the Federal Reserve System (see infra). The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation exercises a residual supervisory authority over those entities and a more
direct authority over state nonmember banks that are federally insured. 223 The
respective competencies of the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation thus overlap with the primary authority of the Comptroller of the Currency
over national banks and the primary authority of state bank supervisors over state
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banks. 224 The Federal Reserve Board has also administrative and enforcement powers
over bank holding companies225 and residual supervisory power over all U.S.
operations of foreign banks. 226
1.3. Means
The Board of Governors is entitled to levy semiannually upon the Federal Reserve
Banks an assessment sufficient to pay its working expenses. 227
2. FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT BANKS
2.1. Structure
The Federal Reserve District Banks are federally chartered corporations, managed
and directed by a board of nine directors. 228 Six members are elected by the member
banks (see infra) in the district (three Class A directors, usually bankers, and three Class
B directors, usually businesspeople). 229 The others (three Class C directors) are
appointed by the Board of Governors. 230The Board designates one of the Class C
directors as chairman of the board of directors and as "Federal reserve agent." One of
the two other Class C directors will be appointed by the said board as deputy chairman.
The directors hold their office for a term of three years; the terms are staggered
in such a way that each year a new director for each class is appointed. 23'The Board
of Governors may suspend or remove officers of the Reserve Banks for cause. 232
The president and vice president of the banks 's board are appointed by the board
of directors with the approval of the Board of Governors. 233The president (or, in his
absence, the vice president) is the chief executive officer of the Bank; his term of office
is fixed at five years. 234
The Board of Governors can permit or require any District Bank to establish
branch banks. These branches will be operated under the supervision of a board of
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directors composed of three to seven people, of whom a majority of one is appointed by
the District Bank. The remaining directors are appointed by the Board of Governors. The
Directors of the branch banks hold their office "during the pleasure of the Board of
Governors"; moreover, the Board of Governors can - at any time - require the District
Banks to discontinue any of their branches. 235
2.2. Tasks
Although the Board of Governors dominates the monetary policy, an important
role is left for the different Reserve Banks. As members of the Federal Open Market
Committee, the presidents of five of the Reserve Banks help determine the objectives and
monetary targets of the Federal Reserve System. The Directors of the Reserve Banks can
also initiate changes in the discount rate (subject to confirmation by the Board of
Governors). 236Furthermore, the Reserve Banks make important contributions to the
monetary debates in the Federal Open Market Committee; they play a role in the
regulation of banksj^and they provide financial services. 238
2.3. Means
Each Member Bank {see infra) is required to purchase an amount of stock in its
District Bank equal to 6% 239of its own capital stock and surplus. 240Public subscription
to the capital stock is possiblej^stock not held by member banks is, however, not
entitled to voting power. 242
The earnings of the District Banks derive primarily from interest received on their
holdings of securities acquired through open market operations, on System holdings of
foreign currencies and on their loans to member banks. 243 Since 1981, earnings of the
District Banks have included fees for various services that they provide to depository
institutions. 244 The profits are paid back to the Treasury. 245
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3. MEMBER BANKS
National Banks (banks chartered by the federal government) become members of
the Federal Reserve System; 246 state-chartered commercial banks or trust companies
may become members of the Fed if they meet specific requirements of the Board of
Governors. 247The same possibility exists for mutual savings banks. 248 Member banks
are required to purchase stock in their Federal Reserve District Bank. This stock is not
traded in a secondary market249 and pays a dividend of 6% annually. 250
4. FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE
4.1. Structure
Until 1922, the different District Banks bought and sold government securities
independently. 231^ May 1922, a Governors Committee, consisting of the governors of
the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Chicago, New York and Philadelphia was set
up. 252 The main task of the Committee was to make recommendations to the Reserve
Banks concerning open market operations.^It was, however unclear whether the
recommendations were binding and whether the District Banks retained the right to
conduct open market operations on their individual initiative. 254 In 1923, the Federal
Reserve Board255 reorganized this Governors Committee into a so-called Open Market
Investment Committee [hereinafter OMIC]. 256 This Committee, together with the
Federal Reserve Board, made recommendations on open market operations to the
different District Banks. Those banks had, however, the right to opt out of the operations
recommended by the OMIC and the Board. Some District Bank officials asserted even
that they had the right to conduct open market operations of which the Board did not
approve. 257By the end of the 1920s, there was a growing opposition against the OMIC
in the southern and western states (who were not represented in the Committee); they
considered the institution to be a "power-hungry, extra-legal body not provided for by
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the Federal Reserve Act." 258 As a result, the Federal Reserve Board decided to dissolve
the OMIC in March 1930, and to replace it with the so-called Open Market Policy
Conference [hereinafter OMPC] in which the twelve District Banks were represented.
This new institution had still no final say over the conduct of open market operations:
the District Banks could still decline to engage in operations recommended by the
OMPC. 259 The OMPC can be considered as the fore-runner of the present Federal
Open Market Committee [hereinafter FOMC] which was established by the Banking Act
of 1933. 26(This statute gave finally legal standing to the institution, which was at this
moment still composed of representatives of all twelve District Banks. The different
Districts were explicitly prohibited from initiating open market operations on their own;
they had, however, still the right to refuse to engage in open market operations
recommended by the Board. The District Banks were even permitted to buy government
securities in emergency situations to afford relief to financial institutions in their
district.
261 The Federal Reserve Amendments of 1935 created the current structure of
the Open Market Committee and made the decisions of this institution binding. 262
Today, the FOMC is made up of the members of the Board of Governors and of
five members elected annually by the board of directors of the twelve Federal Reserve
District Banks from among their presidents and vice-presidents. The New York District
Bank has a permanent representative in the Committee; the other four members are
elected by the other district banks as determined on a rotating basis263 (the presidents
of the other District Banks may participate in the FOMC meetings but are not allowed
to vote). 264 Traditionally, the FOMC elects the chairman of the Board of Governors as
its chairman and the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as its vice
chairman. 265
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4.2. Tasks
Congress has given the FOMC complete authority over the open market
operations. 266 The Federal Open Market Committee meets about every six weeks to
review economic conditions and discuss the appropriate monetary policy to improve the
national economy and prevent adverse conditions from erupting. 267 At its meetings, the
FOMC prepares a policy directive for the manager of the System Open Market Account
(SOMA), a vice-president of the Federal Reserve District Bank of New York. This
directive states the general direction of policy and sets targets for variables such as the
federal funds rate, the level of free reserves, and the various monetary aggregates. The
Trading Desk (Open Market Desk) at the New York Federal Reserve District Bank will
carry out the necessary purchases and sales of securities. 268
The directive adopted at a certain meeting is released shortly after the following
meeting, along with a policy record of the FOMC's assessment of the country's
economic and financial situation, the members' discussion of policy and a record of the
votes taken. 269According to the FOMC, the delay is necessary to avoid the sudden
shifts in interest rates that would accompany an announcement and make government
borrowing more expensive. 270
The domestic open market operations are the exclusive province of the FOMC.
The Federal Reserve District Banks may not engage (or decline to engage) in open
market trading except according to the directions given by the Federal Open Market
Committee. 271
From time to time, the role of the District Bank Presidents within the FOMC has
been criticized. Bernstein272 summarizes the main objections as follows:
Although the FOMC has complete control over the
purchase and sale of government securities by the Federal
Reserve Banks, one of the chief instruments of monetary
policy, almost half of its members are neither appointed by
the President, nor confirmed by the Senate, nor are they
removable except for cause. They are selected by members
of the banking community, the very constituents that the
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FOMC is supposed to regulate. The composition of the
FOMC thus raises questions about the accountability of
those responsible for the monetary policy [...]
273
The constitutionality of the Federal Open Market Committee has, however, always been
confirmed. 274
5. ADVISORY COMMITTEES
5.1. Federal Advisory Council
The Federal Advisory Council was created in an effort to soften the exclusion of
bankers from the Fed itself.275 This Council consists of one member from each District,
elected by the board of directors of the respective District Banks. The Federal Advisory
Council meets at least four times a year in Washington, D.C.; it makes recommendations
to the Board of Governors about economic and banking-related issues. The members also
carry information back to the banks in their areas. The Board of Governors is not obliged
to execute the recommendations of the Federal Advisory Council. 276
5.2. Consumer Advisory Council
The Consumer Advisory Council comprises 30 members, who represent the
financial institutions and their consumers. The Council meets with the Board of
Governors four times a year to discuss consumer-related issues. 277
5.3. Thrift Institutions Advisory Council
The Thrift Institutions Advisory Council is made up of 12 representatives of the
savings banks, savings and loan associations and credit unions. Its task is to advise on
issues related to these types of financial institutions. 278
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CHAPTER 3 INDEPENDENCE
1. POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
The Fed operates relatively free from executive and congressional
controls.^'The following provisions try to assure the independence of the System.
* The President appoints the members of the Board of Governors for fourteen-year
terms. 280 The terms are not renewable; however, an individual appointed to fill a
partially completed term can be re-appointed. The terms are staggered; one term expires
every two years, thus limiting the number of appointments a President can make during
his term in office. 281The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Board are appointed by
the President for a (renewable) four year term. 282Members of the Board of Governors
are only removable by the President for cause. 283
* The Board does not depend on Congress for its operating funds: it can levy an
assessment against the Reserve Banks to supply funds for its operating expenses, and it
can freely choose how these funds will be spent. 284These funds are not part of the
federal budget and, thus, not subject to congressional review. 285
* The Board is not required to obtain advance approval from the Office of Management
and Budget or any other federal agency prior to testifying before or submitting legislating
proposals to Congress. Moreover, the Board can normally not be required to submit
legislative recommendations, or testimony, or comments on legislation prior to their
submission to Congress. 286
However, it should be noted that the Board of Governors is subject to the checks
in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act287and the Government in the Sunshine
Act. 288Furthermore, the Fed must submit to Congress two independent written reports
every year on developments in the national economy, objectives in monetary policy and
the relations between the objectives of the Fed, Congress and the President. 289 The Fed
is also expected to submit an annual report on its operations290and it is obliged to
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publish a weekly statement showing the condition of each Federal Reserve Bank and a
consolidated statement for all Federal Reserve Banks. 291 Aman points out that the
chairman and governors frequently speak before congressional committees about
monetary matters. 292 Furthermore, there are lots of informal contacts with other
policymaking groups within the government. 293
The Federal Reserve System can be considered to be rather independent from a
political point of view. However, the Board of Governors itself finds it more accurate
to characterize the System as "independent within the government."294
2. ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE
As mentioned before, the main threat to the economic independence of a central
bank is the obligation to finance public deficits. 295 There are no real problems here for
the Federal Reserve System as far as the direct credit facilities are concerned. The only
major difference with the European System of Central Banks is that the Fed does
participate in the primary market for public debt.
3. FORMAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE INDEPENDENCE
The above discussion suggests that the Federal Reserve System is rather
independent. However, several commentators argue that in spite of this formal
appearance of independence, the Fed frequently reflects government policy .296It is not
clear by whom and in what manner the System is influenced. Cargill297argues that
[t]he channels of influence from the government to the
[Federal Reserve System] are many, complex, and not time
invariant and there remains considerable controversy
whether they can be modeled in any systematic manner.
They involve pressure brought by the president, Congress,
and within Congress, the Senate Banking Committee, as
well as elements of the private sector through their
influence on government. Many of the pressures revolve
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around the [Federal Reserve System's] overriding concern
with maintaining its "independence" within the government
framework and yet as if in a game with no solution, the
[Federal Reserve System] frequently conducts policy in
accordance with whatever force will ensure its
"independence."
It is, of course, impossible to say at this moment how independent the European
System of Central Banks will be from a substantive point of view. However, the
American experience should be an important caveat for Europe.
TITLE IV
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
CHAPTER 1 DISCUSSION
The European System of Central Banks and the Federal Reserve System might
look rather similar at first sight. Both consist of one central institution (European Central
Bank versus Board of Governors) and twelve regional banks. Although Europe certainly
found inspiration in the federal structure of the American central banking system, 298
the differences between the two systems are as striking as the similarities.
1. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE TWO SYSTEMS
The first and most obvious difference between the two systems is their legal basis.
The European System of Central Banks finds its basis in a Treaty while the Federal
Reserve System is based on an Act of Congress.
The Treaty of Maastricht (and its protocols) can only be changed by common
consensus. Article 106 of the Treaty provides that some articles of the Statute of the
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank may be amended
by the Council, but the articles in question are not related to the objectives and tasks of
the System, the constitution thereof, or the provisions protecting its independence. 299
The Fed, on the other hand, is fully aware that Congress can at any time change its
mandate, responsibilities, or powers. 30OThis might be an indication that the European
System of Central Banks will be somewhat more independent than the Federal Reserve
System.
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2. CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
There appears to be a relation between central bank independence and
macroeconomic performance. Different studies prove that there is a statistical relationship
between the independence of a central bank and the inflation rate. 301The European
System of Central Banks should, therefore, be as independent as possible.
Central bank independence is, of course, not to be taken literally. A central bank
is not placed in a vacuum; there will always be certain ties with political decision-
making. Cargill302rightly points out that "[t]he distinction between different degrees of
independence is necessarily vague since no one argues that the central bank should be,
or could be, completely isolated from its institutional environment and no one has
devised a meaningful index of independence that is time and country invariant. " Any set
of parameters to "measure" the independence of a central bank will, for this reason,
always be somewhat arbitrary. However, following data can give an idea about the
situation in Europe and the United States. 303
Political Independence
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Federal Reserve * * * * * 5
E.S.C.B. * * * * * * 6
Notes
1 = Governor not appointed by government
2 = Governor appointed for >5 years
3 = Board not appointed by government
4 = Board appointed for > 5 years
5 = No mandatory participation of government representative in board
6 = No government approval of monetary policy is required
7 = Statutory requirement that central bank pursues monetary stability
8 = Explicit conflicts between bank and government are possible
9 = Overall index of political independence, constructed as the number of asterisks in columns 1-8
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Economic Independence
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Federal Reserve * * * * * * * 7
E.S.C.B. * * * * * * * * 8
Notes
1 = Direct credit facility: not automatic
2 = Direct credit facility: market interest rate
3 = Direct credit facility: temporary
4 = Direct credit facility: limited amount
5 = Central bank does not participate in primary market for public debt
6 = Discount rate set by central bank
7 = No portfolio constraints in place since 1980
8 = No bank loan ceilings in place since 1980
9 = Overall index of economic independence (being the number of asterisks in columns 1-8)
These data suggest that the ESCB will be even more independent than the Federal
Reserve System. However, as mentioned above, 304 a distinction should be drawn
between formal and substantive central bank independence. It is impossible to predict
how independent the ESCB will be from a substantive point of view.
3. REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES
The basic responsibilities of every central bank are to maintain price stability and
provide lender of last resort services. 305In addition hereto, central banks have assumed
varying degrees of responsibility in the field of financial regulation and
supervision. 306The Federal Reserve System, for example, conducts extensive
supervisory and regulatory functions. The Fed claims that
[it] brings to its decisions on supervisory and regulatory
matters a wide perspective on the financial markets and an
awareness of the general effects that actions affecting
depository institutions may have on other sectors of the
50
economy. Experience gained in the process of supervision
and regulation also enables monetary policy decisions to be
made against the background of a more practical and
knowledgeable assessment of how such decisions will flow
through and interact with the banking and depository
system and financial markets generally. 307
It has also been argued that a lender of last resort must be able to restrict the amount of
credit risk it assumes under such operations through supervision and regulation of the
financial sector. 308
There are, however, important drawbacks related to the combination of central
banking and regulatory responsibilities. It appears to me that the most important objection
is the fact that conflicts might arise because of the differing objectives of monetary policy
and financial regulation. Bank supervision and regulation is directed essentially at
assuring a safe and sound banking system while monetary policy is concerned primarily
with providing a monetary framework within which there can be economic growth
without inflation. 309This brings along several problems. A first problem is that a central
bank is supposed to develop an economy-wide perspective for the conduct of monetary
policy. Financial regulation, on the other hand, brings along a tendency to adopt an
industry perspective. According to Cargill310the danger exists that "ultimately, the
central bank may loss independence in ways that are not too dissimilar to the pressure
for the monetary authority to accommodate government deficits." A second problem is
that while a financial regulatory authority should encourage innovation, the monetary
authority normally is opposed to this because the possible effects on the demand and
supply for money might interfere with money and credit controls. 311 Another drawback
is the fact that monetary policy requires a long-run orientation, whereas financial
regulation tends to focus on the short run. Cargill argues that "the assumption of major
regulatory responsibilities given their short-run and immediate nature is inconsistent with
the time-frame required for achieving long-run price stability because it constantly forces
the monetary authority to adopt a first things first perspective. " 312
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The Treaty of Maastricht offers the possibility of designating the ECB as a
supervisory authority. 313In the light of what has been said, such a transferal of
competence is not desirable. 314 In case the ESCB takes up regulatory responsibilities,
it should assume complete responsibility in this field. Cargill notes that "[i]n the United
States the multiplicity of regulatory authorities has resulted in numerous inconsistencies,
duplication of functions, failure to achieve agency responsibility, and encouraged a type
of financial innovation that is ultimately unstable." 315
It is certainly no solution to keep the regulatory and supervisory responsibilities
decentralized. Without centralized control, the standards for the Community will
probably be set by the central bank branch with the minimal regulatory and supervisory
practices. 316It might be worth considering the establishment of a European "super-
agency" to supervise the financial institutions. However, I am afraid that this is - at least
at this moment - politically impossible. It has been very difficult to have the Treaty of
Maastricht ratified; such an amendment would certainly provoke too many adverse
reactions.
4. FEDERAL VERSUS REGIONAL INTERESTS
The original text of the Federal Reserve Act did not settle the relationship
between the 12 Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Reserve Board. 317Several
factors made the Federal Reserve District Banks hold a dominant role in the early years
of the System. 318 The Banking Act of 1933, however, along with the Banking Act of
1935 made the focus of power shift from the 12 Reserve Banks to the Board of
Governors. 3190nly after these amendments did the new institution come to operate
smoothly. 320
In Europe, the national central banks are likely to hold a dominant position. The
first reason for this is the principle of subsidiarity that is introduced by the Treaty of
Maastricht. As mentioned above, this principle means that all tasks should be executed
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at the lowest appropriate level (i.e., preferably by the national central banks). A second
reason is the fact that within the ECB, the most important decisions will be taken by the
Governing Council (in which the governors of the national central banks have a majority
position). The principle of subsidiarity is, however, rather vague. Moreover, there is no
clear answer to the question what is going to happen if there is discussion on what the
lowest "appropriate" level is in a particular case. The provisions of the Treaty suggest
that the answer might be given by the Court of Justice. 321 It can be doubted, however,
that monetary policy decisions can wait for a court decision.
Eichengreen322thinks that the early history of the Federal Reserve System should
be read as a cautionary tale. Since residual uncertainty remains in Europe over the locus
of control (regional versus federal), the monetary unification might be followed by a
period in which national central banks test the limits of their autonomy and try to
demonstrate to the newly established European Central Bank that they retain a
considerable degree of autonomy. 323The suggestion of the author to reduce the existing
central banks in Europe to mere branch offices of the ECB or of eliminating them
entirely324 is politically impossible at the moment. However, the "the governing board
of the new european central bank should promptly seek to centralize decisionmaking and
to acquire sufficient explicitly defined powers to effectively formulate monetary policy
and carry it out while still giving adequate voice to all 12 member
nations.
"
325According to Jones, this is the "main lesson" that Europe can learn from
eighty years of central banking experience in the United States.326
CHAPTER 2 CONCLUSION
The blueprint for a European Monetary Union looks very promising. The Treaty
of Maastricht provides for a rather independent European central banking system by the
end of the century.
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There are, however, some caveats. First, one should not be too overoptimistic
about the independence of the future ESCB. The American experience shows that there
might be an important difference between formal and substantive central bank
independence. Second, the European Central Bank should not take up regulatory
responsibilities. As stated above, the best solution for Europe would be to create a
"super-agency" to supervise the financial institutions. This is, however, politically
unthinkable at the moment. The second best solution from a theoretical point of view is
probably to give the ECB complete authority to supervise and regulate the financial
institutions in Europe. Third, analogous to what happened in the early days of the
Federal Reserve System, the ESCB might have to experience that controversies over the
locus of control (regional versus federal) should have been solved before the Systems
begins operating and that efficiency requires transnational control. 327
It will probably take some time before the newly established ESCB begins to
operate smoothly. Furthermore, it is not very likely that the twelve Member States enter
stage III simultaneously. At this moment, only Luxembourg, France and Denmark meet
the criteria of convergence. The assertion of certain commentators that the introduction
of the ECU as the single European currency will be determinative in the establishing of
a "European identity", might, for these reasons, be overoptimistic. 328
However, once the system operates smoothly and all Member States are fully
participating, the Monetary Union might open new perspectives for Europe. The
monetary policies of the new European Central Bank will have far more important
spillovers than those of any of the existing central banks in Europe. 329The ECU will
even be a serious challenger for the role of the US dollar as the dominant international
means of payment, unit of account and store of value.330
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1 .De toekomstige rol van de ECU op weg naar een Economische en Monetaire Unie (Tfie
future role of the ECU on the road towards an economic and monetary union), 327
Bulletin van de Generale Bank, 1992, 2.
2.Ivo Maes, Monetaire Integratie (Monetary Integration), Economisch en Sociaal
Tudschrift, 1991, 191.
3.The Delors report (see infra) or "Report of the Committee for the Study of Economic
and Monetary Union", Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, 1989, states on this topic (s. 23):
The adoption of a single currency, while not strictly
necessary for the creation of a monetary union might be
seen as a natural and desirable further development of the
monetary union. A single currency would clearly
demonstrate the irreversibility of the monetary union,
considerably facilitate the monetary management of the
Community and avoid the transactions costs of converting
currencies. The replacement of national currencies by a
single currency should therefore take place as soon as
possible after the locking of parities.
4.Maes, supra note 2, at 193-194.
The European Commission has made an evaluation of the effects of an economic and
monetary union in Europe, and concluded that it would have important advantages as for
efficiency, growth and price stability (see: One Market, One Money, An Evaluating of
the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union,
European Economy (No. 44), Brussels, 1990; and The Economics ofEMU, European
Economy (Special Edition), 1991.
5.The EEC-Treaty contains only few 'monetary' provisions. This can be explained
mainly by the international monetary situation at the time the Treaty was drafted.
According to Whytock, pressure for monetary cooperation within the EC was weak "due
to the stable prevailing international monetary conditions, and the satisfactory functioning
of the Bretton Woods adjustable peg system." (See Christopher A. Whytock, Eurofed:
Toward a European System of Central Banks and a European Central Bank, 23 Law &
Pol'Y INT'L Bus. 469, 484. It should be noted, however, that monetary cooperation in
Europe began before the creation of the different European Communities. In 1950, the
European Payments Union had been set up in order to multilateralize European trade
and payments and in order to provide a framework for moving to convertibility. See
Peter B. Kenen, Group of Thirty, EMU After Maastricht 3 (1992).
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6.The only operational effect of this plan has been the establishment of the Committee
of Central Bank Governors in 1964.
7.This summit was held on 1 and 2 December 1969.
8.Rapport concernant l'Union Economique et Monetaire dans le Communaute,
Supplement au Bulletin, 1970 OJ. (C 36) 11.
The Report called for the establishment of monetary union by 1980.
9.1971 O.J. (C28) 1.
10.The plan provided in the establishment of an economic and monetary union over a
period of ten years and in three stages.
11.1972 O.J. (C 38) 3.
12.The Single European Act [1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 29] introduced a chapter on
"Cooperation in Economic and Monetary Policy (Economic and Monetary Union)" under
Title II (Economic Policy) of the EEC Treaty.
13. Article 102a states in relevant part: "Insofar as further development in the field of
economic and monetary policy necessitates institutional changes, the provisions of Article
236 shall be applicable.
"
14.The so-called Delors Committee was composed of Jacques Delors, Frans Andriessen,
the Presidents of the Central Banks of the 12 Member States and three experts:
Alexandre Lamfalussy (Belgium), Niels Thygesen (Denmark) and Miguel Boyer (Spain).
15.A. Steinherr notes very cynically that such an ECU would be nearly the same as the
German Mark (cf. EMU - Scenarios for Stage Two, ECU-Newsletter January 1991,
15.)
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16. In December 1989, the Strasbourg Summit decided to convene an Intergovernmental
Conference in December 1990. In June 1990, the Dublin Summit decided that two
conferences were necessary: one on EMU and the other on political union.
17.The draft Treaty text can be found in 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.
18. Article R.2 of the Treaty states that "[it] shall enter into force on 1 January 1993,
provided that all the instruments of ratification have been deposited, or, failing that, on
the first day of the month following the deposit of the ratification by the last signatory
State to take this step." The Treaty of Maastricht entered into force on 1 November
1993.
19. This was possible because the first stage of EMU would only entail changes in the
role and operation of existing institutions. These changes were introduced by way of
Council Decision 90/142/EEC [1990 O.J. (L 78)] which amended Decision 64/300/EEC
[1964 O.J. (L 77)] on cooperation between the central banks of the Member States of the
European Economic Community, and by Council Decision 90/141/EEC [1990 O.J. (L
78)] on the attainment of a progressive convergence of economic policies and
performance during stage one of Economic and Monetary Union. The latter decision
repeals Council Decision 74/120/EEC on the attainment of a high degree of convergence
of the economic policies of the Member States of the European Community and Council
Directive 74/121/EEC on stability, growth and full employment in the Community.
20.This was decided at the Madrid Summit (June 1989); the beginning of the first stage
coincided with the entering into force of the directive concerning a free movement of
capital which was adopted in June 1988 by the Council Directive 88/361/EEC, [1988
O.J. (L 178) 5].
21.Article 103.2.
22. Article 103.3.
23. Article 103.4, first paragraph.
24. Article 103.4, second paragraph.
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25. It can be derived from the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice that the
measures decided on are binding. In the Schluter Case, the Court decided that the
Council may take all measures provided for in article 189 of the Treaty (cf. 1973 E.C.R.
1135). Article 103a. 1 has a permanent nature; the possibility in which this article
provides does not end with the first stage.
26. Article 109e.2(a) and Article 73b. It should be noted that this arrangement only took
full effect after 1 January 1994.
27.Article 109e.2(a) and Article 104.
28. Article 109e.2(a) and Article 104a. 1.
The prohibition will only take full effect in the second stage; at this point, the Member
States are only expected to take provisional measures.
The United Kingdom obtained that it may maintain its "Ways and Means" facility with
the Bank of England if and so long as the United Kingdom does not move to the third
stage (See Article 11 of the Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).
29. Article 109e.2(a).
30.Article 109e.2(b).
31.The Monetary Committee which exists since 1958 (cf. Article 105 EEC Treaty) will
continue its operations, and finds a place in the new Article 109c. From the beginning
of the third stage, an Economic and Financial Committee will replace the Monetary
Committee.
32.See 1989 O.J. (C 241) 1.
33. Article 109e.l.
34. Article 3.1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European Monetary Institute.
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35. Pursuant to Article 73e, restrictions on movements of capital which are authorized on
31 December 1993, can be maintained until 31 December 1995 at the latest. The
restrictions allowed may find a basis in the Directive on Complete Freedom of Capital
Movements or in Article 108 of the EEC Treaty. This provision is of importance to
Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece.
36. Pursuant to Article 73d, exceptions are allowed on the basis of public policy and
security. Furthermore, necessary arrangements can be provided for to prevent
infringements of national laws and regulations (particularly in the field of taxation and
the prudential supervision of financial institutions). At the same time, procedures are
allowed for the declaration of capital movements "for purposes of administrative or
statistical information". In the tax field, it has been provided that provisions of the
national tax laws which distinguish between tax-payers who are not in the same situation
with regard to their place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital is
invested remain possible (a declaration on Article 73e makes clear that this possibility
applies only between the Member States with respect to the relevant provisions which
exist at the end of 1993). The measures and procedures referred to in Article 73d shall
not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free
movement of capital and payments.
37.Article 73 C provides that the restrictions which exist on 31 December 1993 under
national or community law adopted in respect of the movement of capital to or from third
countries involving investment (including investment in real estate), establishment, the
provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets can be
maintained. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the
Commission, adopt measures in these areas. Unanimity is required for those measures
which constitute a step back in Community law in regards to liberalization of the
movement of capital to or from third countries.
Article 73 F states that where in exceptional circumstances movements of capital to or
from third countries (threaten to) cause serious difficulties for the operation of EMU, the
Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after
consulting the ECB, may take safeguard measures with regard to third countries for a
period not exceeding six months (provided that such measures are strictly necessary).
On the basis of Article 228a and 73g, the Council (acting by a qualified majority on a
proposal of the Commission) may parallel with the common foreign and security policy,
restrict the movement of capital and payments to or from certain countries. Article 73g.2
allows Member States to take unilateral measures as long as the Council did not decide
on such measures. The Council may (again acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
of the Commission) decide that the Member State concerned shall amend or abolish such
measures (Article 73g.3).
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38.5^ Article 104.1. Section 2 of this article provides an exception for publicly owned
credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall
be given the same treatment by national central banks and the ECB as private credit
institutions.
39. Article 104a. 1.
40. Article 104b. 1.
41.The term "government" should be interpreted as general government, that is central
government, regional or local government and social security funds, to the exclusion of
commercial operation, as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic
Accounts (see Article 2 of the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure).
42. Article 109e.4.
During the second stage, there is no real prohibition. Member States are obliged to avoid
excessive government deficits from stage three (cf. Article 104c. 1 and Article 109c. 3).
43. Article 104c. 2 and Article 1 of the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure.
44.Article 104c.3.
45./J.
46.Article 104c.4 and Article 109c.
47...but only in case the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member
State exists or may occur (Article 104c. 5).
48. Article 104c. 6; the decision will be taken by a qualified majority of the votes.
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49.Article 104c.7.
50.Article 104c.8.
51.The Council will take the decisions under Article 104c.7 and 8 on a recommendation
from the Commission by a majority of two-thirds of the votes weighted in accordance
with article 148J.2 of the EEC-Treaty. The Member State concerned is not allowed to
vote.
52. Article 104c. 12.
53. Article 109f.l.
54.The President will be appointed by common accord of the governments of the
Member States at the level of Heads of State or Government. Account will be taken of
the recommendation from, as the case may be, the Committee of Governors of the
central banks of the Member States or the Council of the EMI. The European Parliament
and the Council will be consulted on the nomination (Article 109f.l). At the Summit in
October 1993, the Belgian Alexandre Lamfalussy has been appointed as the first EMI-
President; he will stay on for a period of three years which started on 1 January 1994.
55. Article 109e.5.
56.Article 103a.2.
57. Article 104c. 1.
58. Article 104c. 11.
Fratianni points out that
it is not clear that penalties, if imposed, can be enforced.
The Council of Ministers will find it hard in any case to
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collect fines imposed on governments that are in financial
difficulty, and the Accord does not give the Council the
authority to resort to "natural" penalties, such as the
suspension of regional and structural funds or funds
covered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
Furthermore, European politicians will dislike the prospect
of governments having to tell their citizens they must suffer
the consequences of austerity programs to satisfy
bureaucrats in Brussels.
See Fratianni et al., Princeton University, The Maastricht Way to EMU 40
(1992).
59. Id.
60. Article 104c. 12.
The decision to impose sanctions and the decision to abrogate them has to be taken on
a recommendation from the Commission by a majority of two-thirds of the votes
weighted in accordance with article 148.2. The Member State concerned is not allowed
to participate in the voting (cf. Article 104c. 13).
61. Actually, the European Central Bank (or "Eurofed" as it was originally called), was
scheduled to be set up at the beginning of the second stage. However, in September
1991, the [ECO/FIN] Council, meeting in Apeldoorn (The Netherlands) decided to
postpone its creation until stage three. Instead, a transitional institution would be set up:
the European Monetary Institute. The advantage of this is that the ECB "will not be
burdened with public memories of the political or economic quagmires that may be
encountered during the transition phase." See Fratianni et al., Princeton
University, supra note 58, at 16-17.
62. Article 4a. Actually, the establishment occurs already before the third stage. Article
1091 provides that immediately after the decision on the date for the beginning of the
third stage has been taken in accordance with Article 109J.3 (or immediately after 1 July
1988), the governments of the Member States will appoint the President, the Vice-
President and the other members of the Executive Board of the ECB. As soon as the
Executive Board is appointed, the ESCB and the ECB shall be established and shall
prepare for the full exercise of their powers which will start on the first day of the third
stage (see Article 1091.1).
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63. Article 106.1.
64. Article 106.2.
65.The term "System" should be understood only to describe the existence of the ECB
and the NCBs as integral parts of the system, governed by a common set of rules and
committed to the objectives and tasks assigned to it. See Chrystopher A. Whytock, supra
note 5, at 482 n. 110.
66. Article 3b and Article 12.1. of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
67. It should be noted at this point that as soon as the ECB is established, it will take over
the tasks of the EMI, which will go into liquidation (Article 1091.2).
68....and the dissolution of the Monetary Committee (cf. Article 109c. 2).
69. Article 1091.4 stresses that this measure will not modify the external value of the
ECU.
70.Article 1091.4.
It is possible that the national currencies and the ECU will circulate side by side for a
while. The problems that this may generate are discussed in Continuity and innovation
in the transition from the old ECU to the new ECU, ECU Newsletter, March 1992,
16.
71. Article 105a.2 provides that "[t]he council may, acting in accordance with the
procedure referred to in Article 189c and after consulting the ECB, adopt measures to
harmonize the denominations and technical specifications of all coins intended for
circulation to the extent necessary to permit their smooth circulation within the
Community."
72. Article 109c.2.
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73. Article 109c, in fine.
74.Article 109c. 1.
75. Article 109f.
76.The "Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeois" is attributed the status of central bank in
the Treaty (cf. Article 1.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European Monetary
Institute and Article 1.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and of the European Central Bank). The IML used to be only an observer in the
Committee of Presidents of the Central Banks.
77. Article 109f.l.
78.The appointment will follow a recommendation from, as the case may be, the
Committee of Governors of the central banks of the Member States or the Council of the
EMI, and after consulting the European Parliament and the Council. The President will
be a person of recognized standing and professional experience in monetary or banking
matters and has to be an EC-national (Article 109f. 1). He is appointed for a period of
three years (Article 9.3. of the Protocol on the Statute of the European Monetary
Institute). In October last year, Alexandre Lamfalussy was appointed as the first President
of the EMI. He took up his functions on 1 January 1994.
79.The European Monetary Cooperation Fund was set up by Council Regulation 907/73
[1973 O.J. (L 89) 2].
80. Article 109f.l and 109f.2.
81. Article 109f.2 and Article 4.1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European
Monetary Institute.
82. Article 109f.3 and Article 4.2. of the Protocol on the Statute of the European
Monetary Institute.
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83. Article 109f.3 and Article 4.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European
Monetary Institute.
84. Article 109f.4, Article 109f.5, Article 109f.6 and Article 6.4 of the Protocol on the
Statute of the European Monetary Institute.
85.This provision aims to ensure "that transactions with these reserves shall not interfere
with the monetary policy and exchange-rate policy of the competent monetary authority
of any Member State and shall be consistent with the objectives of the EMI and the
proper functioning of the exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS." {see Article 6.4 of the
Protocol on the Statute of the European Monetary Institute).
86. Article 6.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European Monetary Institute.
87.Article 109a.2(a).
88. Article 109a.2(b); the initial appointment of the members of the Executive Board is
organized in Article 50 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and of the European Central Bank.
89. Article 12.1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
90. Article 109a. 1.
91. Article 12.1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
92. Article 12.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
93. Articles 10.2 and 10.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
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94. Article 53 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank makes clear that it will only remain to exist as long
as there are Member States with a derogation (see infra).
95. Article 45.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
96. Cf. Article 45.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and of the European Central Bank.
97. Article 108a. 1.
98. Article 108a. 2.
99. Article 108a.3.
lOO.Article 109.
101. Article 105.4, first indent.
102. Article 105.4, second indent.
103. Article 105.5.
104. See Article 105.6 and Article 25.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
105.See Article 5.1 and 5.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
106.Article 5.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
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107. See Articles 28 and 29 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
108. Article 30 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
109. Article 106.1.
110. Article 106.3.
111. Article 3.1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
1 12.The [ECO/FIN] Council formulates the general orientations for exchange-rate policy
(Article 109.2). The Council will act by a qualified majority either on a recommendation
from the Commission and after consulting the ECB or on a recommendation from the
ECB. The Council may also unanimously decide, on a recommendation from the ECB
or from the Commission (after consulting the ECB) and after consulting the European
Parliament, to conclude formal agreements on an exchange-rate system for the ECU in
relation to non-Community currencies (Article 109.1). The [ECO/FIN] Council may,
acting by a qualified majority, on a recommendation from the ECB or from the
Commission (after consulting the ECB) adopt, adjust or abandon the central rates of the
ECU within the exchange-rate system. The European Parliament will be informed about
any such decision (Article 109.1). All Council decisions in this field have to be without
prejudice to the primary objective of the maintaining of price stability.
113. Article 22 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank states that "[t]he ECB and national central banks may
provide facilities, and the ECB may make the regulations, to ensure efficient and sound
clearing and payment systems within the Community and with other countries."
114. QT. Article 3b.
11 5. Alberto Alesina & Vittorio Grilli, The European Central Bank: reshaping monetary
politics in Europe, in Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons
from THE US 49, 55 (Matthew B. Canzoneri et al. eds., 1992).
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11 6. Traditionally, an independent central bank is seen as the best guarantee for a low
inflation. See, e,g, Michele Fratianni et al., Princeton University, supra note 58,
at 28. A classic counter example is the Japanese central bank; the Japanese inflation rate
is rather low while its central bank is not so independent (at least not formally). Cf.
Thomas F. Cargill, Central Bank Independence and Regulatory
Responsibilities: The Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve 3 (1989).
111.See also Article 7 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and of the European Central Bank.
Fratianni points out that is might be difficult "[to] discern between information gathering
and consultation with national authorities, the Council of Ministers and the European
Commission - as mandated in Articles 108 and 109 of the Accord - and actions that
reflect seeking and taking instructions.
"( See Fratianni et al., Princeton University,
supra note 58, at 34).
118. Article 27 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
119. Article 108a and Article 34 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
120.FRATIANNI et al., Princeton University, supra note 58, at 37.
121. Article 109a.2.(b) and Article 11.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. Kenen (supra note., at 30)
points out that as members of the Executive Board cannot be reappointed, they will have
no incentive to please politicians - not those of Member States or those of the
Community. However he admits that other authors think that Board members may try
to please politicians precisely because their terms are not renewable and, thus, they will
need new jobs after 8 years on the Board {Id. at 30 n.28).
122.Note that Article 14.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank prescribes that "the term of office of
a Governor of a national central bank shall not be less that five years."
123. Article 11.4 and 14.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
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124.Id.
125. Article 109b. 1.
126.1d.
127.Article 109b.2.
128. Article 109b. 3; Article 15 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank provides that the annual report will be
made available to interested parties free of charge.
129. Article 109b. 3, in fine.
130. Article 15. 1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
131. Article 15.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
132. Article 15.4 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
133.Alesina & Grilli, supra note 115, at 56.
134.74.
135. Article 104 and Article 21.1 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
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136.Article 109c.2.
137.74.
138. Article 109c.2, in fine.
139. Article 109e.l.
140. Article 109e.2.(b).
141.Article 109J.1.
142.These criteria are listed in Article 109j of the Treaty and explained in a separate
protocol. The (non)sense of the criteria is discussed by W.H. Buster, De Zin van de
Maastrichtse Begrotingscriteria, E.S.B., 1992, 527-529; see also J.J. Sijben,
Geloofwaardigheid en reputatie in de overgangsfase naar de EMU, Bank. Fin., 1992,
211-217.
143. Article 109J.1, first indent and article 1 of the Protocol on the Convergence Criteria
referred to in Article 109j of the Treaty establishing the European Community
[hereinafter Protocol on the Convergence Criteria]. The Protocol states that the average
rate of inflation, observed over a period of one year before the examination may not
exceed by more than 1.5% that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in
terms of price stability.
144. See Article 109 .j.l, second indent and Article 2 of the Protocol on the Convergence
Criteria. It can be derived from these articles that the ratio of the planned or actual
government deficit to gross domestic product may not exceed 3 % unless the excess over
the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the
reference value. The ratio of government debt to gross domestic product may not exceed
60 % . An exception may be made in both cases if the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and
approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.
145. Article 109J.1, third indent and Article 3 of the Protocol on the Convergence
Criteria.
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146. Article 109J.1, fourth indent and Article 4 of the Protocol on the Convergence
Criteria. The interest-rate criterion is to be respected over a period of one year before
the examination.
147.Article 109J.1, in fine.
148.Article 109J.2.
149.See Article 109J.3. The decisions will be taken by a qualified majority.
150.There are only two ways to keep stage three from starting in 1999: the first is by
deciding before 1998 to start this stage on a date later than 1 January 1999; the other
possibility is to amend the Treaty (which is very unlikely in light of the difficulties that
have arisen in the ratification of the original text).
151. Article 109J.4; see also the Protocol on the Transition to the Third Stage of
Economic and Monetary Union.
152.See Article 109k. 1.
153.This arrangement can be analyzed as follows:
On the one hand, this significantly reduces the prospect that
high-inflation, high-public-debt countries will be admitted
into a low-inflation community of countries with sound
public finances. Thus, low-inflation countries may go ahead
with EMU without having high-inflation countries join for
a free ride. On the other hand, discarding the principle of
an EMU that automatically includes all EC members has
reduced Southern Europe's power to bargain for additional
compensation and has diminished the relevance of the
Social Charter.
See Fratianni et al., Princeton University, supra note 58, at 9.
154.The Council will decide according to the procedure laid out in Article 109k. 1 and
109k.2.
155. See Article 109k.3.
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156. Article 43.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
157.See Article 109k.5.
15$.See Article 43 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank.
159. Article 48 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
160. Articles 45 and 53 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and of the European Central Bank.
161. Article 45.2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank.
162. Cf. Article 45.3 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks and of the European Central Bank.
163. Cf. Article 109j (the convergence criteria remain applicable to these countries) and
Article 109m.
164. Article 109k.3 implies that Article 104c. 1 will take full effect while Article 104c.
9
and 104c. 11 are not yet applicable.
165. Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland.
166. Cf. G. Brouhns, La conference intergouvernementale sur I'union economique et
monetaire, Doc. Fin., May/June 1992, 32.
167. Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to Denmark.
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\6S.See William A. Lovett, Banking and Financial Institutions Law 33 (1992).
The explanation given by the author is that
[t]ools and capital goods imported from the mother country
absorbed a heavy deficit in payments from the colonies
with substantial net credits from English merchants and
bankers. And while the balance of payments with the West
Indies was favorable, leading to a steady inflow of Spanish
dollars, the better coins were sent back to England. This
left a scarce supply of specie in the colonies, featuring a
considerable residue of worn and clipped dollars.
169.The independence was declared in July 1776. By 1777, the Articles of Confederation
were drafted; they were, however, not finally ratified until 1781. In September 1787, the
Constitution of the new nation was signed and submitted to Congress; it became effective
in July 1788.
170.LOVETT, supra note 168, at 34.
171.U.S. Const, art. I, s. 8 confers the power "[t]o coin Money, regulate the Value
thereof, and of foreign Coin" upon Congress.
172. Acts to Charter the Bank of the United States, Feb. 25 and Mar. 2, 1791, chs. X-XI,
1 Stat. 191, 196. It should be noted, however, that this Bank was not the first U.S. bank.
As soon as 1781, the Bank of North America had been chartered by the United States
Congress under the Articles of Confederation. Cf. Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding
Company Act: Has it lived its life ?, 38 Vill. L. Rev. 2, 8 (1993).
173.Jeff Madura, Financial Markets and Institutions 356 (1992).
174. See Lovett, supra note 168, at 9.
175.LOVETT, supra note 168, at 35.
176.Act to Charter the Second Bank of the United States, Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat.
266.
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177.Thibaut de Saint Phalle, The Federal Reserve an Intentional Mystery 44
(1985).
178.The bank was reorganized as a Pennsylvania state bank, but failed in the subsequent
depression.
179.The Act currently characterized as the National Bank Act of 1863, was originally
called the National Currency Act (cf. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, s. 11, 12 Stat. 665,
668). In 1874, the name changed to National Bank Act (see Act of June 20, 1874, ch.
343, s. 1, 18 Stat. 123).
180. This Act did, of course, not create a "central bank." However, Lovett notes that "it
did strengthen banking reserves, facilitate assistance from larger city banks, and
encourage a stronger banking center for the nation in New York City." (see Lovett,
supra note 168, at 43).
IZl.See Alfred C. Aman Jr., Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and
Limits of Conditions by the Federal Reserve Board, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 837, 841 n.16
(1989).
182.Madura, supra note 173, at 356.
183.Act of May 30, 1908, ch. 229, 35 Stat. 546.
ISA.See Lawrence E. Clark, Central Banking under the Federal Reserve
System 21 (1935).
185.Act of May 30, 1908, ch. 229., s. 17, 35 Stat. 552.
186. Clark, supra note 184, at 22.
187.Report of the National Monetary Commission, S. Doc. No. 243, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess. (Jan. 8, 1912).
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188.The plan provided for a central bank ("National Reserve Association of the United
States"), with a head office in Washington, D.C., and fifteen branches throughout the
country. The Association would be chartered for fifty years. Both state banks and
national banks could purchase stock in the new institution. The National Reserve
Association would be controlled by the banks, their voting rights being dependent upon
their share in the capital stock.
189. Clark, supra note 184, at 28.
190. This bill differed from the Aldrich bill is several particulars; see Clark, supra note
184, at 29-32.
\9\.See Clark, supra note 184, at 27.
192.Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (current version at 12 U.S.C ss. 221-522
(1988)).
193.Actof Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, s. 1, 38 Stat. 251.
194. tee Lovett, supra note 168, at 47.
195. President Truman forced the Treasury on 4 March 1951 to recognize that the
monetary policy would be set by the Federal Reserve System and that the debt would not
be monetized by the Fed. According to DE Saint Phalle (supra note 177, at 75), the
agreement was largely a promise by the Fed of cooperation with the Treasury, rather
than a declaration of independence.
196. It should be noted that the System does not act very much in the manner anticipated
by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 {See de Saint Phalle, supra note 177, at 56).
197.The Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, s. 203(b), 49 Stat. 704 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
s. 241 (1988)) excluded the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the
Currency from membership on the Board (originally, they were members ex officio).
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198.The President may not select more than one person from any Federal Reserve
District, and should choose persons with backgrounds in agriculture, finance, industry
and commerce. See 12 U.S.C. s. 241 (1988).
199.12 U.S.C. s. 242 (1988).
200.12 U.S.C. s. 241 (1988).
201.12 U.S.C. s. 242 (1988).
202.1d.
203.1d.
204. It should be noted that the Board of Governors also has responsibilities in the area
of the nation's payments mechanism and for federal consumer credit regulations. These
aspects are, however, less important within the framework of this thesis. Cf. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Federal Reserve System
Purposes & Functions 4 (1984).
205.William C. Melton, Inside the Fed 4 (1985).
206. Actually it lasted until the 1920s until the buying and selling of securities was
"discovered" as an effective tool of monetary policy. Cf. Carl H. Moore, The
Federal Reserve System a History of the First 75 Years 65 (1990). Moore notes
that the "[TJounding fathers of the Federal Reserve System envisioned the discounting of
commercial paper by member banks as the heart and soul of the system." (Id. at 126).
207.12 U.S.C. s. 461(b)(2)(A) (1988).
Since 1980, the reserve requirement is applied to all commercial banks, whether or not
they are members of the Federal Reserve System. See Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, s. 103, 4 Stat.
132, 133-138; codified at 12 U.S.C. s. 461(b) (1988).
The Board of Governors admits that adjustments to the reserve requirements are not well
suited to the day-to-day implementation of monetary policy, an important reason being
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that "[they] are an important variable in banks' business calculations, and frequent
changes in them would unnecessarily complicate financial planning by these institutions."
Cf Board of Governors, supra note 204, at 70.
208.12 U.S. C. s. 357 (1988).
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Act of 1980 provides that
nonmember institutions having deposits reservable under the Act would have access to
the discount window on the same basis as member institutions. Cf. Board of
Governors, supra note 204, at 57. The Board of Governors notes that
[t]he Federal Reserve Act originally envisioned that the
discount rate of each Reserve Bank would be set to reflect
the banking and credit conditions in its District. Over the
years, however, the progressive integration of regional
credit markets into a fluid national market has gradually
produced a national perspective for discount rate
determination. As a result, the twelve Reserve Banks now
post a uniform structure of discount rates except during the
short periods when some Reserve Banks already have
changed their rate, but the boards of other Reserve Banks
have not yet met to take such action.
Id. at 63.
209.12 U.S. C. s. 301 (1988).
210.15 U.S.C. s. 78g (1988).
211.Mark F. Bernstein, The Federal Open Market Committee and the sharing of
Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75 Va. L. Rev. Ill, 118 (1989).
212.12 U.S.C. s. 248 (j) (1988).
213.12 U.S.C. s. 248 (a)(l)(1988).
214.A*.
215.12 U.S.C. s. 357(1988).
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216.12 U.S. C. s. 248-1 (1988).
217.12 U.S. C. s. 248 (b) (1988).
218.12 U.S. C. s. 248 (f) (1988).
219.12 U.S. C. s. 248(g) (1988).
220.12 U.S.C. s. 248 (h) (1988).
221.12 U.S. C. s. 348a (1988).
222.The most important are the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) and
the National Credit Union Insurance Fund (NCUSIF).
223.See the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. ss. 1811-1834 (b) (1988)), as further amended by the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991 (FDICIA). The FDICIA was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Deposit
Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat.
2236. Section 307 of the latter Act has expanded the back-up enforcement authority of
the FDIC to cover al insured depository institutions (previously, it was only applicable
to thrift institutions). See 12 U.S.C. s. 1818(t) (1988).
224.See Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, The Federal
Response, And the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 Fordh. L.Rev.
1133, 1160(1990).
225.See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. ss. 1841-1850 (1988)), as further amended by various provisions of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub.
L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 195. It should be noted, however, that Congress did not
preempt all state regulation over bank holding companies. The Bank Holding Company
Act states that the different states will keep "such powers and jurisdiction which it now
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has or may hereafter have with respect to companies, banks, bank holding companies,
and subsidiaries thereof (cf. 12 U.S.C. s. 1846 (1988)). The Supreme Court has ruled
that this provision permits the states to adopt nondiscriminatory laws with respect to bank
holding companies that are more restrictive than federal law (See, e.g., Lewis v. BT
Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 48-49 (1980).
226.12 U.S.C. s. 348a (1988).
227.12 U.S.C. s. 243 (1988).
228.12 U.S.C. ss. 301-302 (1988).
229.See 12 U.S.C. s. 302 (1988); 12 U.S.C. s. 304 (1988) describes the procedure for
the selection.
230.12 U.S.C. ss. 302 and 305 (1988).
231.12 U.S.C. s. 308 (1988).
232.12 U.S.C. s. 248(f)(1988).
233.12 U.S.C. s. 341 (1988).
234.12 U.S.C. s. 341 (1988).
235.See 12 U.S.C. s. 521 (1988).
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236.12 U.S.C. ss. 301 and 357 (1988).
231.See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. s. 325 (1988).
238.The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 requires
that the Reserve Banks charge for the cost hereof, and that all depository institutions
must have access to these services (see 12 U.S.C. s. 248a (1988)).
239.12 U.S.C. s. 282 (1988).
An amount equal to 3% is paid in, while the balance is subject to call by the Board of
Governors. It is, however, not very likely that the balance will ever be demanded
because the District Banks have little need of money. Cf. Benjamin Haggott
Beckhart, Federal Reserve System 45 (1972).
240.Melton, supra note 205, at 8 explains that
[m]any felt that the commercial banks that stood to benefit
directly from the ability of the Federal Reserve Banks to
make advances should reasonably be expected to bear the
cost of providing for their establishment through
subscribing equity capital. At the same time, there was
strong sentiment in banking circles that the Federal Reserve
Banks should be largely under the control of the banking
community, and not the federal government. Private
ownership seemed to meet that objective.
24l.See 12 U.S.C. s. 283 (1988).
242.12 U.S.C. s. 285 (1988).
243.Board of Governors, supra note 204, at 9.
244.1d.
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245.12 U.S. C. s. 289 (1988).
246.12 U.S. C. s. 222 (1988).
247.See 12 U.S.C. s. 321 (1988). The Board will consider "the financial condition of the
applying bank, the general character of its management, and whether or not the corporate
powers exercised are consistent with the purpose of [the Federal Reserve Act]" (12
U.S.C. s. 322 (1988)). The Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat.
132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) gave nonmember banks access to some
of the same services as member banks. They are also subject to the same reserve
requirements. See s. 103(b), 94 Stat. 132, 133-135.
248.12 U.S.C. s. 333 (1988).
249.12 U.S.C. s. 287(1988).
250.12 U.S.C. s. 289 (1988).
251.Ralph Jay Wexler, Federal Control over the Money Market, 27 Ariz. St. L. J. 159,
178 (1981).
*
252.The Governors Committee was set up in response to concerns by the Secretary of
Treasury that the uncoordinated purchases of the Reserve Banks were adversely affecting
the market for government securities. See Bernstein, supra note 211, at 119 n.34.
253.1d.
254. See Barry Eichengreen, Designing a central bankfor Europe: a cautionary talefrom
the early years of the Federal Reserve System, in Establishing a Central Bank:
Issues in Europe and Lessons from the U.S. 13, 17 (Matthew B. Canzoneri et al.
eds., 1992).
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255.The Federal Reserve Board was the forerunner of the Board of Governors. See
Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, s. 203, 49 Stat. 704.
256.The resolution approved by the Board on 22 March 1923 added a fifth member to
the Committee, to be appointed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The newly
formed Open Market Investment Committee came - according to the resolution - under
the general supervision of the Federal Reserve Board.
See Eichengreen, supra note 254, at 18.
257.Eichengreen, supra note 254, at 19.
258,/rf.
259.Eichengreen, supra note 254, at 20.
260.Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, s. 8, 48 Stat. 168 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
s. 263 (1988)).
261. Eichengreen, supra note 254, at 20.
262.Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, s. 205, 49 Stat. 648 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. s. 263 (1988)).
263.12 U.S.C. s. 263 (1988). One of the representatives is elected by the board of
directors of the Reserve Bank of New York; one by the boards of the Reserve Banks of
Boston, Philadelphia and Richmond; one by the boards of the Reserve Banks of
Cleveland and Chicago; one by the boards of the Reserve Banks of Atlanta, Dallas and
St. Louis; and one by the boards of the Reserve Banks of Minneapolis, Kansas City, and
San Francisco.
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264. It should be noted that there is no provision in the Federal Reserve Act that makes
the removal of a Reserve Bank representative possible (Bernstein, supra note.., at 143).
The Board of Governors is allowed to remove Reserve Bank officers for cause (see 12
U.S.C. s. 248 (f) (1988)). This provision, however, was not intended to grant the Board
removal power over the Reserve Bank representatives on the FOMC (Id. at 144 n.163).
265.Board of Governors, supra note 204, at 7.
266. Bernstein, supra note 211, at 139.
267.Madura, supra note 173, at 359.
268.12 U.S.C. ss. 353-359 (1988) define the various assets that the Federal Reserve can
trade in the open market. Most operations, however, are carried out in the market for
United States government securities because
the central bank must be able both to buy and sell on a
timely basis, at its own convenience, in whatever volume
may be needed to keep the supply of reserves in line with
prevailing policy objectives. These conditions require that
the instrument it buys or sells be traded in a broad, highly
active market that can accommodate the transactions
without distortions or disruptions to the market itself. The
market for U.S. government securities satisfies these
conditions, and the Federal Reserve carries out by far the
greatest part of its open market operations in that market.
See Bernstein, supra note 211, at 115.
269. Bernstein, supra note 211, at 117 n.2L
270.FOMC v. Merill, 443 U.S. 340, 346-349 (1979). The Supreme Court decided that
the information contained in the directives is exempted from the Freedom of Information
Act (Id. at 354-360; see 5 U.S.C. s. 552(b) (5) (1988).
271.12 U.S.C. s. 263 (b) (1988).
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lll.Supra note 211, at 111-112.
273.The structure of the FOMC has been defended on the basis that the participation of
private bankers is politically and practically necessary to the effective operation of the
FOMC. The Reserve Bank representatives have denied that they are captives of private
banking interests; furthermore the FOMC has insisted that they strictly separate their
duties on the FOMC from their work in the Reserve Banks, that they not take
instructions from their boards of directors and that they not divulge the FOMC's secret
actions {Id. at 136-137).
llA.See, e.g., Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1986),
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